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Abstract—As businesses, governments and professional insti-
tutions progressively seek to engage with consumers via social
media platforms (SMPs), the capacity of SMP users to validate the
source of received content and its integrity, becomes increasingly
significant. Historically, SMPs have an associated legacy of
security concerns, many of which pertain to content integrity.
In this paper, we present designs for multi-channel overlay
protocols, that are used to implement ad-hoc authentication of
user-generated content (messages), in social media platforms. Our
approach draws inspiration from protocols that are convention-
ally used for pairing wireless devices in ad-hoc networks. Hence,
we compare and contrast conventional device pairing protocols
with our own, as well as consider the security characteristics,
benefits and limitations of our protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
The scope of user-generated content (messages) shared via
social media platforms (SMPs) is as vast as it is diverse. User-
generated content is typically reflective of the multifarious
social interactions, that occur between friends and special
interest groups. Increasingly however, interactions in SMPs
(examples of which include Facebook, Line, LinkedIn, Kik,
SnapChat, Twitter, WhatsApp, and YouTube) are used as
data sources for Social Customer Relationship Management
(socialCRM) tools , described in [1] as an emerging sector, that
enables businesses, organisations and government institutions
to dynamically engage with their consumers in a way, that
is beyond conventional channels (e.g. email, surveys etc).
However, as complex multi-user applications, SMPs have
spawned a legacy of security concerns, many of which pertain
to the confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) of user-
generated content.
In our previous research published in [2], we described how
SMPs posed specific confidentiality threats to user-generated
content and proposed the use of virtual private social net-
working techniques (a concept proposed in [3]) to mitigate
such threats. We also specified how content integrity can
be detrimentally impacted by format, capacity and semantic
constraints that are routinely imposed by some SMPs, thus
deeming them to be untrusted.
A. Research Contribution
In this paper, we are primarily concerned with mechanisms
for authenticating the integrity of content that is shared be-
tween SMP users. Therefore, we conceptualise and propose
designs for multi-channel overlay protocols that can be applied
by SMP users in an ad-hoc manner. Verifying content integrity,
is relevant to scenarios that utilise time stamped legal docu-
ments, files that are analysed under forensic investigations and
journalistic content, where statements, images and videos may
need to be validated as unaltered and genuine. The motivations
for our approach are based on concepts derived from hash
based protocols that are conventionally applied to pairing
wireless devices in ad-hoc networks. As a hash based family
of device pairing protocols, we note that concepts published in
[4], [5], [6] and [7] are particularly relevant to our work and
therefore, we collectively refer to them as hash based device
pairing protocols, in this paper.
B. How this paper is organised
In Section II, we present related work in the context of
motivations for our approach, as well as requisite terminology
and concepts that are fundamental to this research. We present
our protocol concepts, techniques and security evaluations, in
Section III and the benefits and limitations of our protocols
are outlined in Section IV.
II. RELATED WORK
As a background to our research, we refer to hash based
device pairing protocols, specifically research published in
[6] and MANA protocols presented in [7]. Therefore, in this
section we define requisite terminology that will be used
throughout this paper and outline hash based device pairing
protocol concepts and implementation assumptions. This sec-
tion concludes with a definition of some notations and an
outline of protocol event sequences.
A. Requisite Terminology
We use the term entity to refer to a device, user or host
within a network. Entities interact with each other as senders
and recipients (in the context of message integrity) and as
claimants and verifiers (in the context of origin integrity). The
term channel is used to describe a communication link that is
established between entities. These links may be physical or
logical, secure or insecure, and wireless or wired. Channels
may also have specific security characteristics that classify
them as Out-of-Band (OOB), thus deeming them suitable for
secure and private message transmissions. A message (i.e.
data), is defined as the means by which entities interact via
channels (i.e. entities exchange messages). A message can
take many forms including binary, hex, text, image, audio and
video.
1) Message and Origin Authentication: The goal of es-
tablishing message integrity (message authentication) aims to
ensure that a message shared between a sender and a recipient
is preserved and validated to be exactly as issued by the
sender (i.e. a digest of a message calculated at source and
destination, would be identical). Establishing origin integrity
(origin authentication) aims to validate the source of where
a message is believed to have originated from, such that a
message sent to a verifier called Bob, that is believed to have
originated from a claimant called Alice, can be trusted to have
actually originated from the claimant called Alice (i.e. it was
not intercepted, modified or re-transmitted by a malicious third
party).
2) Authenticated Channels: To contextualise additional
protocol security considerations, we refer to work published
in [8], in which the author considers the security of channels
in terms of weak authentication and strong authentication. A
weak authenticated channel (also referred to as an authenti-
cated channel) denotes that messages transmitted via a given
channel, cannot be changed. However, the transmission of a
message may be subject to attacks in which they may be
malevolently interrupted, removed, or replayed. The author
informally describes a strong authenticated channel as an
authenticated channel that possesses an additional security
characteristic, such that one or more of these attacks can
be mitigated. Examples of such characteristics include stall-
free transmission of a message, acknowledgement by a veri-
fier to a claimant of receiving a message and verifier-ready
transmissions, that allow a claimant to check that a verifier
is awaiting incoming messages on an authenticated channel.
Based on these security properties, a human OOB channel can
be described as a strong authenticated channel in the context
of the hash based device pairing protocols that we reference.
B. Device Pairing Concepts and Implementation Assumptions
In [6], [7] and [9] (the underlying hash based device pairing
protocols considered in this research) a common scenario is
presented in which two wireless devices (e.g mobile phones,
keyboards, speakers, displays etc) want to identify and securely
pair with each other over a wireless link. This pairing step
(referred to in [6] as a pre-authentication step), is typically
instigated prior to the devices implementing further protocols
(e.g. key agreement, channel encyption etc). These protocols
require two channels, hence the proposal to formally ac-
knowledging them as multi-channel protocols proposed by the
authors in [9]. The first channel is wireless and is considered
to be untrusted. The second channel is designated as a secure
OOB channel and is considered to be trusted. Note that the
OOB channel is typically a ‘human’ channel, in that it relies
on human intervention, scrutiny and actions to achieve strong
authenticated security characteristics.
These non-interactive protocols (i.e. a protocol that re-
quires transmission activity from only one party) have two
fundamental stages. In the first stage, the claimant sends a
secret key and message verification via the OOB channel to
a verifier. The message verification may typically be derived
from a cryptographic primitive, such as a secure hash func-
tion, hashed based message authentication code (HMAC) or
commitment scheme. Such that the message authentication
is short enough to be of practical use when being manually
applied by human actions, and long enough to provide a
secure key space. In the next stage, the claimant sends a
message via the wireless channel to the verifier, who uses the
secret key and message verification (previously received via
the OOB channel) to authenticate the message received via the
wireless channel. If authentication is successful, the verifier
can trust that the originator of both the message, message
verification and key, have all originated from the same source,
thus enabling further protocol implementations to commence
(e.g. channel encryption, key exchange etc). These protocols
are implemented based on the assumptions described in II-C.
C. Device Pairing Protocol Assumptions
The communication channel between devices is typically wire-
less and is deemed to be insecure, where messages transmitted
may be subject to threats associated with man-in-the-middle at-
tacks, namely eavesdropping, interception, interruption, mod-
ification and replaying.
The devices may not necessarily have matched input and
output capabilities (e.g. a mobile phone may have a screen
and keyboard, but wireless speakers might only have an LED
and function buttons).
The devices cannot use a public key infrastructure or any
trusted third party certification authority to aid pairing.
The devices can communicate via an additional channel (OOB)
that is assumed to be controlled by a single human or pair of
users who trust each other. Integrity of this channel is assumed
to be established and requires human judgement and actions
(e.g. entering a pin or capturing a token via a camera, touching
devices together etc) to function. This effectively obtains a
strong authenticated channel as per the concepts described
in Section II-A2.
D. Notations and Protocol Event Sequences
We denote A as a claimant device that must be authenti-
cated, and B as a verifier device that will validate A. Let w be
a wireless channel and o, an out-of-band channel. Finally, let
m denote a message, k a random secret key, h a cryptographic
hash function and d a message digest. The protocol event
sequences are outlined as follows:
A calculates k
A calculates d = h(k||h(m))
A transmits k and d over o to B
A transmits m over w to B
B calculates dˆ = h(kˆ||h(mˆ))
B compares dˆ and d
A generic diagram depicting hash based device pairing
protocols is shown in Figure 1.
A
k, d−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
o
B
A
m−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
w
B
Fig. 1. Generic hash based device pairing protocol sequence
A match between dˆ and d, authenticates A. Having suc-
cessfully authenticated A, conventional channel encryption or
key exchange protocols etc, can be implemented. As shown in
[7], this protocol achieves security against a man-in-the-middle
attack, based on the assumptions described in Section II-B
and the premise that an adversary has the scope to control the
wireless channel but not the human OOB channel. However,
we note that in [9], the authors suggest that this assumption
can no longer be made for human OOB channels, due to the
pervasiveness of CCTV.
III. OUR APPROACH
We recall from the introduction to this paper, that our
research is concerned with multi-channel overlay protocols
and how they can be used to establish ad-hoc authentication
of user-generated content, shared between SMP users. We
note that not all content shared between users will need to
be authenticated, thus we use the term ad-hoc in the context
of protocols that can be applied over a dynamic choice of
channels, as and when they are required. In this section, we
present requisite terminology and describe our approaches for
two specific multi-channel protocols. For each protocol, we
describe our approach, define some notations, outline protocol
event sequences, consider the impact of channel eavesdropping
and modification on each protocol and summarise implementa-
tion requirements. The benefits and limitations of each protocol
are considered in section IV.
A. Terminology and Concepts
We begin by mapping definitions for the terms ‘entity’,
‘channel’ and ‘message’ (previously described in Section II-A)
to equivalent objects in the context of SMPs. Therefore, SMP
user accounts are considered to be analogous to entities, SMPs
to channels and user-generated content to messages. We note
that entities may share messages intrinsically, via a channels
publishing infrastructure (e.g. page, wall, post, tweet, alert
etc) or extrinsically, via a channels private messaging or file
attachment features, where a recipient entity’s intention is to
access a message outside of the channel through external tools
(e.g. image reader, media player, decompression software).
1) Channel Threats to Message Integrity: SMP channels
are unauthenticated according to the definition proposed in [8]
and as articulated in Section II-A2, however they are distinct
and autonomous hosts, that impose security mechanisms that
aim to protect their systems and users. As publically accessible
applications, it is in the interests of many SMPs to proactively
maintain and improve security. Therefore, we assume for
example that SMPs establish encrypted links between remote
users and themselves (e.g by implementing https sessions) and
utilise challenge-response password mechanisms etc. To this
end, we limit our security concerns to those that might occur
within the confines of the SMP.
Theoretically (and practically), some SMP channels have
the scope to conduct the kind of malicious activities that are
conventionally associated with a man-in-the-middle (MitM)
attack, namely eavesdropping, interception, interruption, mod-
ification and replaying messages. However, whilst the practice
of interception, interruption and replay actions are clearly not
in the best interests of a channel’s business model, entities have
no mechanism for verifying that eavesdropping does not take
place or restricting SMP applied modifications to messages,
that may be actioned for functional reasons. For example, a
channel could legitimately access and analyse messages for
keyword searches and behaviour tracking purposes, and deem
the practice necessary in the context of revenues derived from
targeted advertising. It would seem clear that eavesdropping
in this context is not intentionally malicious, but may still be
perceived by some entities, as a threat. Likewise, modification
of a message by channels for the purposes of conforming it to a
pre-designated format or specification (e.g. format conversion,
cropping or resizing an image, modifications to meta-data etc)
may not be deliberately malicious, but may be perceived as a
threat to content integrity none the less.
A further integrity concern, results from the requirement to
publish messages that are contextually relevant (i.e. appropriate
messages in an appropriate context). For example, contextual
relevance limits the use of publishing encrypted messages
as they would appear out of place and potentially raise the
suspicions of the channel, perhaps resulting in messages being
sanitised or an account entity being suspended. Additionally,
the imposition of a capacity limit on messages may also
impact message integrity. For example, Twitter was originally
designed to be text-centric and imposes a 140 character limit
on tweets, thus the original form of a message may have
to be modified, in order to comply with specified capacity
limits. In short, messages that are shared via channels, must
be transmitted in a manner that mitigates any integrity threats
posed by some channels. To this end, SMP’s that are used in
multi-channel protocols, cannot be designated as trusted out-
of-band channels in accordance with the notions described in
[5], [7] and [6]. Therefore, their practical use in multi-channel
protocols, relies on certain assumptions that are detailed in
Section III-B.
B. SMP Multi-channel Overlay Protocol Assumptions
SMPs are trusted to maintain origin authentication mecha-
nisms between entities (as described in Section II-A1). Origin
integrity is a fundamental requirement for a reliable, practical
and convenient SMP, therefore, we consider this to be a fair
assumption.
We assume that a single adversary may control no more than
a single channel and that channels do not collude or have an
implied collusion. For example, Facebook own WhatsApp and
Instagram, therefore these channels would not be paired in a
multi-channel protocol.
It is assumed that communication links between an entity and
SMPs are https secured, confining man-in-the-middle based
attacks to within the SMP infrastructure. However, whilst we
consider interception, interruption and replay attacks by SMPs
on it’s users to be contradictory to business interests and
therefore highly unlikely, we accept that eavesdropping and
modification threats remain.
In the context of legitimate use of these protocols within SMPs,
we assume that detection by the SMP of authentication activity
is not considered to be malicious, unless it somehow impairs
their business model or contravenes their terms and conditions
of use.
We assume that communicating entities have appropriate and
fully functioning accounts on relevant SMPs and that they trust
each other.
The entities do not use a public key infrastructure or any
trusted third party certification authority to validate message
integrity.
C. Protocol 1
The approach in this protocol, generally mirrors that of
the hash based device pairing protocols described in Section
II-B, with some notable differences. Firstly, Protocol 1 is not
constrained to using digests of a restricted size (e.g. a digest
does not have to be truncated as it is not processed manually
by ‘hand’). Secondly, SMP channels are unauthenticated and
therefore cannot be utilised as OOB channels, which by
definition are strong authenticated channels. Consequently, in
Protocol 1, channels are limited to a usage scenario in which
confidentiality of messages cannot be assumed, thus rendering
the use of a secret key as irrelevant.
Like the hash based device pairing protocols, Protocol 1 has
two fundamental stages. In the first stage, the message sender
transmits a message verification via an elected SMP channel
to the recipient. In the second stage, the sender transmits a
message to be authenticated, via the alternate SMP channel,
to the recipient. The recipient uses the message verification
previously received via the first SMP channel, to authenticate
the message received via the second SMP channel. Message
authentication is successful if the recipient can reproduce the
message verification value.
1) Notations and Protocol Event Sequences: We denote A
as a sender entity that transmits a message m to a recipient
entity, B. Let s0 and s1 be two separate and non-colluding
SMP channels, h a cryptographic hash function and d a
message digest. The sequence for this protocol is shown in
Figure 2 and is expressed as follows:
A calculates d = h(m)
A transmits d over s0 to B
A transmits m over s1 to B
B calculates dˆ = h(mˆ)
B compares dˆ and d
A
d−−−−−−−−−−−−→
s0
B
A
m−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
s1
B
Fig. 2. Protocol 1 - Event Sequence
Theorem 1. If dˆ = d, the integrity of m is verified hence
mˆ = m. If dˆ 6= d, the integrity of m is not verified and B only
knows that either d or m have been modified.
Proof: Modification to d by channel s0 would mean
that B cannot not authenticate m. Likewise, if channel s1
modifies m in some way, m cannot be authenticated by B.
Therefore, B can authenticate m under the assumption that
neither channel applies modifications, but in the event that
authentication does fail, B cannot determine which channel
applied the modifications.
2) The Implications of Channel Eavesdropping: Entity B
wants to authenticate the integrity of m received from entity
A, via channel s1. To achieve this, entity B requires d that
is received via channel s0. Channel s0 eavesdropping on d,
cannot associate this content with m on channel s1, therefore
channel s0 has access to a digest, but nothing that it pertains
to. However, if d is not published in a contextually relevant
manner, it may appear as suspicious to channel s0. To mitigate
this problem, A must ensure that d is published in a contex-
tually relevant manner. Assuming that m is also contextually
relevant, eavesdropping by channel s1 would reveal generic
and innocuous content that does not appear suspicious. Thus
we conclude that providing d and m are published in a way
that is contextually relevant and does not contravene the terms
and conditions of the SMP, that eavesdropping by a channel
does not impair the functionality of this protocol.
3) Implementation: Participants require access to a cryp-
tographic hash function tool. They should also have user
accounts on multiple SMPs and must pre-agree a selection
of SMPs that may be used as channels. Recipient B, also
needs to be able to identify verifiable content. B can achieve
this by accepting that the receipt of d over s0, indicates that
m, sent via s1 can be authenticated. An additional recipient
acknowledgement step can be added, requiring B to return
an agreed acknowledgement message to A. For example,
this could be a text-based response message that features a
particular emoticon sent via channel s0. Adding this step would
transform this protocol from being non-interactive, to interac-
tive as well as adding a strong authenticated characteristic to
channel s0, although the channel would still be considered as
unauthenticated.
D. Protocol 2
The concept for our second approach is some what uncon-
ventional and can be viewed as a commitment scheme. It yields
notable security properties that are evaluated in Section IV.
This protocol requires the use of two SMP channels and can
be implemented non-interactively or interactively, dependent
on the participants requirements. It also relies on the use of
an additional SMP account (i.e. one that has been previously
created by the sender) that is used exclusively for the purpose
of authenticating transactions; thus we will refer to this account
as an authentication transaction account (ATA). Details of
the ATA (i.e. SMP and login name) must be pre-shared with
intended recipients.
The stages of this protocol are defined as follows. The
sender creates a message (e.g. an image) and calculates a
message digest. The sender logs in to the ATA and sets the ATA
password to the value of the message digest. The last action on
the sender’s part, is to transmit the message to the recipient, via
the alternate SMP (i.e. the SMP on which the ATA does NOT
reside). On receipt of the message, the recipient calculates the
digest of the message, and uses it as a password to login
to the ATA. A failed login would indicate that the message
received had been modified, whilst a successful login indicates
message integrity. This protocol becomes interactive, if the
recipient sends an acknowledgement message to the sender
whilst logged in to the ATA. In order for this protocol to be
implemented, the following additional assumptions to those
described in Section III-B, have to be made:
A sender must create and maintain an ATA, which must be
created prior to the implementation of the protocol.
Appropriate details of the ATA (i.e. SMP name, login name)
must be pre-shared with trusted recipients.
The ATA password mechanism must have the capacity to store
a password that is equal to the length of a message digest.
1) Notations and Protocol Event Sequences: We denote
A as a sender entity, B as a recipient entity, T as an ATA
entity and r as a password. Let s0 and s1 be two separate and
non-colluding SMP channels, m a message, ma an acknowl-
edgement message, h a cryptographic hash function and d a
message digest. The sequence for this protocol is shown in
Figure 3 and expressed as follows:
A calculates d = h(m)
A logs in to T over s0 and sets r = d
A transmits m over s1 to B
B calculates dˆ = h(mˆ)
B logs in to T over s0 using dˆ as r
B transmits ma over s0 to A as T
A successful login to T by B using dˆ as a password,
indicates message integrity, whilst a failure to login would
indicate modification to m.
2) The Implications of Channel Eavesdropping and Modifi-
cations: Eavesdropping by channel s0 might observe a change
of r for T . We note that eavesdropping may also reveal user
activity tracking and IP address data that could be utilised by
s0 to monitor the account activity of T . However, a password
A
login−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
s0
T set r = d
A
m−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
s1
B
A
ma←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
s0
T
login with password =dˆ←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
s0
B
Fig. 3. Protocol 2 - Event Sequences
reset should not in itself be deemed as suspicious and therefore
contextual relevance is not an issue, as it could be in Protocol
1. It is assumed that m is published in a contextually relevant
manner, and thus eavesdropping by channel s1 would likewise
reveal innocuous and unremarkable content.
Modification of r by s0, is highly unlikely as it would
be against the business interests of SMPs to modify user
passwords. Therefore, integrity of r may be deemed to be
somewhat resilient. Like Protocol 1 however, channel s1 could
modify m in some way, meaning that B would be unable to
authenticate m. Therefore, B can authenticate m under the
assumption that channel s1 does not apply modifications and
in the event that authentication does fail, B can assume that
the modification was applied by channel s1.
3) Implementation: The participants of this protocol re-
quire access to a cryptographic hash function tool and like
Protocol 1, they should have user accounts on multiple SMPs
and pre-agree a selection of SMPs that may be used as
channels. Additionally, this protocol requires a sender to create
and maintain a dedicated ATA account for each SMP channel,
the details of which (i.e. SMP, login name) must be shared
with trusted recipients. Unlike Protocol 1, this protocol has no
intuitive way to indicate that m can be validated. Therefore,
we propose a simple example based on the use of emoticons,
such that when A sends m to B, that m features an agreed
emoticon signifying that m can be authenticated. This protocol
can be described as an interactive protocol, that includes a
strong authenticated feature on channel s0, as described in
Section II-A2. However, like Protocol 1, the channels are still
considered unauthenticated.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed and evaluated two multi-
channel overlay protocols that enable users in social media
platforms (SMPs), to apply ad-hoc authentication of user-
generated content shared in SMPs. Our approach has been
influenced by protocols that are conventionally used for pairing
wireless devices in ad-hoc networks, where they are utilised
to mitigate threats associated with man-in-the-middle attacks.
Therefore, in this section, we clarify differences in protocol
goals and characteristics, that demarcate this research from the
conventional use of protocols in device pairing and conclude
with a summary of the benefits and limitations for the protocols
we have proposed.
A. Hash based device pairing protocols and SMP multi-
channel overlay protocol disparities
The first disparity between the protocols lies in their goals,
where device pairing focuses on ad-hoc entity authentication
and our protocols focus on ad-hoc message authentication.
Similarly, the assumptions between channel properties also
differ. In device pairing the main channel is assumed to be
wireless and untrusted, and an additional trusted OOB channel,
is a requisite factor in order for the protocol to function. In our
approach, both channels are SMPs and untrusted as they do not
poses the security characteristics of a human OOB channel as
described in [6] and [7]. Furthermore, in our protocols the link
between an entity and the SMP is assumed to be secured using
https and we assume that entity authentication is imposed by
the SMP (as per our assumptions detailed in Section III-B.
Another major disparity relates to the origin of security
concerns. The security concerns for hash based device pairing
protocols pertain to man-in-the-middle related threats over the
wireless channel. These threats are mitigated based on the
assumption that messages are sent via two channels and that
all messages must be accessed in an unaltered manner, to
authenticate an entity. The security of this approach relies on
the notion that an attacker cannot access all channels (one of
which is an OOB channel). In our overlay protocols, we rely on
the same notion for security, however our security concerns are
considered to originate from the SMP rather than conventional
man-in-the-middle attacks.
B. Benefits and Limitations
Protocol 1 has the benefit of being easy and intuitive to im-
plement as well as having a scalability advantage over Protocol
2. However, it has the limitation that message authentications
(e.g. digests, commitments, HMACs) must be published in a
manner that is contextually relevant. In some SMPs this may be
problematic, however can be mitigated by concealing message
authentications as payloads in steganographic carriers.
Protocol 2 is somewhat unconventional in that is relies on
the use of an account password to securely share a message
authentication with a recipient. It’s benefits include the sharing
of a message authentication in a manner that precludes it
from modification (a characteristic that does not feature as
part of the first protocol.) We note that use of an ATA in
this protocol, may contravene the terms and conditions of
some SMPs. Furthermore, frequent changing of an account
password, might be deemed as suspicious behaviour by some
SMPs. We also note that the account registration processes of
some SMPs can be extensive, sometimes requiring an email,
mobile number and private address details. Additionally, some
password update mechanisms require email validation. This
combination of account creation and password updates, add
management and administrative overheads that may restrict the
use of this protocol to very small user groups.
C. Further Research
It is envisaged that further research, will combine tech-
niques described in this paper with steganographic techniques,
thus achieving security characteristics that establish message
confidentiality, contextual relevance and message authentica-
tion.
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